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Abstract: An indivisible good is an ideal type with interesting properties and strong implications
about public policy. It is a good - such as a heart transplant or a treatment for AIDS - that must
be consumed in a fixed amount or not at all. The community’s demand curve for an indivisible
good is a rotation of the distribution of income. Monopolization of ordinary goods can be
expected to reduce everybody’s consumption; monopolization of indivisible goods knocks out 
low income consumers. Deadweight loss from monopolization has a distinct distributional aspect
best captured in a utility-weighted measure. Indivisible goods are strong candidates for public
provision and for the expropriation of patents.      
Introduction
A good is defined here as “indivisible” when a fixed amount is useful, less is useless and
more is superfluous, so that each person wants to buy either that fixed amount (typically one
unit) or none at all. You cannot have half an appendectomy and wouldn’t want a second. Nor can
you benefit from half an AIDS treatment or half a course of antibiotics; you must take the entire
treatment if it is to do you any good. The indivisible good is, of course, an ideal type to which
actual goods conform to a greater or lesser extent, but the study of the indivisible goods may cast
light on economic phenomena and suggest economic arguments that might otherwise be
overlooked. 
This article establishes several propositions about indivisible goods.:
- A person’s demand curve for an indivisible good is a pair of vertical lines.
- A community’s demand curve for an indivisible good is a rotation of the distribution of income.
- The community’s elasticity of demand for an indivisible good is the measure of equality in the
distribution of income.
- Everybody deterred by monopolization from consuming an indivisible good is poorer than
anybody not deterred.3
- The deadweight loss from the monopolization of an indivisible good arises entirely from its
impact on poor people.
These propositions will be “proved” conclusively. They are proved in the sense that they
are implied by certain axioms. In high school geometry, we looked upon axioms as self-evident
truths. In the social sciences we have no such luxury. These propositions will be proved on the
strength of whatever assumptions about the economy are necessary to make them true, in the
hope that there is enough space between assumptions and propositions to render the propositions
interesting and useful.
Three large implications will be drawn from these propositions, one analytical and the
other two about public policy. The analytical implication is that a measure of deadweight loss
might be constructed in utils rather than in dollars. The political implications are that 
- A strong objection to the socialization of commodities - that a given expenditure on
redistribution is always more beneficial to the recipients when provided in cash rather than in
kind - is much weaker for indivisible goods than for ordinary goods, which is why medical care
is socialized in many countries,  but never hats or sweaters.
- The case for expropriation of patents is much stronger for indivisible goods than for ordinary
goods.
Both of these political implication are best thought of as factors in the choice of  public policy,
rather than as decisive all by itself.  
The plan of the article is this: The first section is about the derivation of the demand
curves for indivisible goods, with emphasis on the contrast between the shape of the demand
curves for the individual and for society as a whole. The demand curve for society is nothing
more than a rotation of the distribution of income. When the distribution of income conforms to a
Pareto function, the elasticity of demand and the measure of equality are one and the same. The
next section is about he consequence of the monopolization of indivisible goods. Typically, a rise
in the price of an ordinary good induces everybody, rich or poor, to consume less. By contrast, a
rise in the price of an indivisible good leaves richer people’s consumption unaffected and stops
poorer people from consuming altogether, so that the deadweight loss from monopolization
corresponds exactly to the harm inflicted upon people who are too poor to consume the good at
the higher price but not too poor to consume it at the original price. In these circumstances, it
may be instructive to construct measures of surplus and deadweight loss in utils rather than in
dollars. The article concludes with a discussion  of the relevance of the distinction between
ordinary and indivisible goods in weighing the pros and cons of the socialization of commodities
and of the choice between prizes and patents as ways of encouraging invention   
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The Demand for Indivisible Goods
Indivisibility, as defined here, is a property of taste rather than technology. There need be
nothing unusual about the supply curve of an indivisible good, and, for convenience, it is
assumed to be flat so that market price is invariant. Indivisibility is defined in the first instance
with reference to the utility function. A distinction is drawn between indivisible goods and
ordinary goods. For ordinary goods, utility increases steadily with the amount consumed. For an
indivisible good, utility is higher if one consumes the appropriate amount than if one does not,
but utility is not augmented by consuming less than the appropriate amount or by additional
consumption over and above the appropriate amount. Throughout this paper, units of the
indivisible good are graduated so that the appropriate amount is just equal to 1.
The distinction between ordinary goods and indivisible goods is reflected in their demand
prices. A person’s demand price for an ordinary good is a continuously decreasing function of the
amount consumed. A person’s demand price for an indivisible good is a reservation price. A unit
of the indivisible good is purchased if one’ reservation price exceeds the market price, but not
otherwise.
  A person’s utility function covering an indivisible good as well as a vector of ordinary
 goods must be of the form 
u = u(ä,  x * ) ( 1 )
where u is utility, x* is a vector of quantities of ordinary goods consumed and ä signifies the
presence or absence of the indivisible good; ä = 1 when the indivisible good is consumed and 
ä = 0 when it is not.  
Indivisible goods are endowed with two associated properties. First, they must not be
indispensable. The concept of indivisible goods is uninteresting unless a person has a real option
to consume or not to consume. The reservation price would otherwise be meaningless. Second,
and more problematically, indivisible goods are assumed to be separable from ordinary goods
within the utility function. Separability means that, at any given set of market prices, the amount
consumed of each and every ordinary good is dependent on total expenditure on ordinary goods
alone, regardless of whether or not the indivisible good is consumed as well. Expenditure on
each and every ordinary good is the same for a person with $90 to spend and who desists from
buying the indivisible good as it would be if that person had  $100 to spend of which $10 was
spent on the indivisible good. Separability ensures that a person’s reservation price for the
indivisible is an increasing function of his income. The higher a person’s income, the more he
would be prepared to pay for the indivisible good rather than do without it altogether.
Separability restricts the form of the utility function. With separability, the utility function
in equation (1) reduces toThe concept of indivisible goods in this paper is similar but not quite identical to a
2
concept employed by Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), Blackorby and Donaldson(1988) and
Besley and Coate (1991). Their “indivisible good” is introduced as an instrument for
redistribution when the government cannot see who is poor . The good must be indivisible in the
sense that a person can only make use of one unit at a time, but it must also be amenable to
variation in quality, so that, for example, a poor person would accept the offer of a low quality
house but a rich person would not. Houses in their context would be indivisible in the sense that
a rich person would be worse off well off with two low quality houses than with one high quality
house. By contrast, an indivisible good in this paper must be of uniform quality so that a person
acquires a full dose or none at all. For houses to be indivisible in this sense, there must be only
one quality of house. Such goods are sometimes called “preclusive”; ignoring the condo in
Florida, consumption of one unit, large or small, precludes consumption of another.
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u = u{ä, v(x*)} (2)
where v(x*) is a subordinate utility function of the vector of ordinary goods alone, where 
u{1, v(x*)} is necessarily greater than u{0, v(x*)} and where u{0, v(x*)} must be finite as long
as the indivisible good is not indispensable.
In an atemporal context, indivisible goods might be exemplified by medical
insurance on the understanding that care is the same for every insured person and that, without
insurance, one receives no medical care at all. Newly-invented goods may approximate pure
indivisibility when the difference between having the good and not having it dwarfs the
difference in usefulness between better or worse variations of the good. Newly-invented goods
are obviously not indispensable because there was a time when people had to make do without
them. Local telephone service is indivisible in so far as one pays a fixed fee regardless of how
much one’s phone is used.   
Indivisibility lies at an extreme of a continuum; it is a property that goods possess to a
greater or lesser extent. You either have a kidney transplant or you don’t, but a kidney transplant
is not perfectly indivisible in so far as  there is a choice in the quality of the surgeon or the
standard of hospital care. In practice, most goods differ in quality as well as in quantity. Purely
and completely indivisible good would differ in neither dimension. While it is hard to imagine
goods with no variation in quality whatsoever, some goods are close enough to complete
indivisibility, and the practical implications of indivisibility are striking enough, to make the
analysis of indivisible goods interesting and useful.    
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To establish the strong propositions about indivisible goods at the beginning of the paper,
the utility function in equations (1) or (2) will, from now on, be confined to a very simple form.
Assume there are only two goods, one ordinary good with a price per unit of 1 and one
indivisible good with a price per unit of p, so that the budget constraint of a person with an
income of Y becomes Replace the scalar x in the utility function of equation (3) with utility of ordinary goods,
3
v(x), where x is a vector of quantities of ordinary goods consumed and where v(x) is Cobb-
Douglas. Specifically, the person’s utility function becomes 
u  =  A v ( x )
ä
j where v(x) = Ðx   
á j
j j  where x is his consumption of the good j, where each á is a  fixed coefficient and where the sum
of all such coefficients is equal to 1. The person maximizes utility in equation (1*) subject to his
budget constraint
jj Ó p x + äp  =  Y
j where p is the price of the j  good and p is, once again, the price of the indivisible good.
th
A distinction must now be drawn between a person’s total income, Y, and his expenditure
on ordinary goods, M, where, necessarily,
6
x  +   ä p  =  Y    ( 3 )
where x is the quantity of the ordinary good, where, once again, ä = 1 if the indivisible good is
consumed and ä = 0 otherwise. The postulated utility function is 
u  =  A x ( 3 )
ä
where A is a constant greater than 1. In effect, u = Ax if the person consumes the indivisible
good as well as x units of the indivisible good, and u = x if the person consumes x units of the
ordinary good but not the indivisible good. It must be the case that A > 1 to ensure that a person
is better off consuming than not consuming the indivisible good for any given consumption of
ordinary goods is. When the indivisible good is medical, the ordinary good x can be thought of as
available together with a certain survival probability and risk of discomfort from illness, and the
parameter A can be thought of as the multiple by which survival probability or comfort increases
as a consequence of the consumption of the indivisible good.
On these assumptions, the person’s utility becomes
 u = A (Y - äp ) ( 5 )
ä
and the person can be thought of as maximizing utility by his choice of ä. This formulation is
somewhat less restrictive than might at first appears because Y, x and p can be interpreted as
total real, real income devoted to ordinary goods and the price of the indivisible goods in terms
of ordinary goods rather than dollars.   
3M = Y - äp
Regardless of whether or nor a person purchases the indivisible good, he can be thought of as
choosing a vector of ordinary goods to maximize v(x) subject to his budget constraint
jj Ó p  x  =  M
j where p is the market price of the ordinary good j. The process gives rise to an indirect utility
function of ordinary goods
v  =  K M / I
jj where K is a constant term (equal to Ðá  ) and I is a geometric price index (equal to Ðp  ).
áj áj
Replacing the direct utility of ordinary goods in equation (3) with the indirect utility in
equation (13), we arrive at the utility function 
u = A KM/I = A K[(Y/I) - ä(p/I)]   
ää
where Y/I can be interpreted as real income, p/I can be interpreted as the real price of the
indivisible good and the constant term K will cancels out in the determination of a person’s
reservation price for the indivisible good. The expression Y/I plays the role of x in equation (4),
and the expression p/I plays the role of p in equation (3). The preceding equation is virtually the
same as equation (5) in the text. All of the propositions to be derived about the one can be
derived about the other as well.Nor would it matter if v were concave in the limited sense that the
sum of the exponents in the Cobb-douglas utility function is less than 1. But the  restriction of
v(x*) to the Cobb-Douglas form is important. Without it results to be derived below must be
seen as approximations.
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As a function of income, Y, a person’s reservation price for the indivisible good is an
immediate derivable from the utility function in equation (5). Without the indivisible good,
utility becomes  
0 u  =  Y ( 6 )
With the indivisible good, utility becomes Could an indivisible good ever be inferior in the sense that its reservation price is higher
4
for the poor than for the rich? Not as the indivisible good is defined in equation (3) where,
analytically, it acts as a magnifier of the utility of all ordinary goods together. An indivisible
good might be inferior within the more general utility function of equation (1) where there is
nothing to forbid the indivisible good from magnifying the utility of some ordinary goods more
than others. If the rich consume relatively more meat and the poor consume relatively more
potatoes, an indivisible good that magnifies the nutritional impact of potatoes but not meat might
be worth more to the poor than to the rich. 
8
1 u  = A(Y - p) (7)
One’s reservation price for the indivisible good is the price just high enough to make one
indifferent between consuming and not consuming the indivisible good. It is the price for which
1 0 u = u , so that
Y = A(Y - p) (8)
Thus p (Y) = Y(A - 1)/A (9)
D
where p (Y) is the reservation price when one’s income is Y.  
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Figure 1: A Person’s Demand Curve for an Indivisible Good
Regardless of the form
of utility function, a person’s9
reservation price for an indivisible good must be as shown in figure 1. The reservation price of
person i is designated as p (i), and the corresponding demand curve must consist of  two vertical
D
lines, one above p (i) at a quantity of 0 and the other below p (i) at a quantity of 1. This is in
DD
sharp contrast with the demand curve for an ordinary good in which the demand price is a
continuously decreasing function of the person’s quantity consumed. If person i’s utility function
is as indicated in equation (4) and if his income is Y, his reservation price, p (i), must equal
D
p (Y) in equation (9). 
D
The next step in the argument is to connect the demand curve of a person to the demand
curve of a community of people with identical utility functions corresponding to equation (4) but
different incomes. It turns out that the community’s demand curve is downward-sloping, just like
a person’s demand curve for an ordinary good. More interestingly, the community’s demand
curve for an indivisible good is a simple inversion of the distribution of income.
We shall illustrate this in two stages: first for a group of three people and then for a large
economy. Designate the three people as 1, 2, and 3, and let their demand prices be  p (1), p (2),
DD
p (3)  such that p (1) > p (2) > p (3) . As shown in figure 2, the demand curve for these three 
D DDD
people together is obtained by adding quantities horizontally. Nobody buys the indivisible good
when the price exceeds p (1). Only person 1 buys the indivisible good - so that only 1 unit is
D
purchased -when the market price is between p (1) and p (2).  Persons 1 and 2 buy the
DD
indivisible good - so that 2 units are purchased - when the market price is between p (1) and
D
p (2). Finally, all three people buy the indivisible good - so that 3 units are purchased - when the
D
market price is below p (3) That being so, the demand curve consists of four vertical segments as
D
shown by the four bold lined in figure 2.
  
Figure 2: The Demand Curve for a Group of Three People10
           A smooth downward-sloping demand curve for an indivisible good emerges when the
market is composed of a large number of potential buyers ordered in accordance with their
demand prices, and with very small differences between contiguous people in that ordering.
Information about the distribution of income can then be employed to convert a function p (Y)
D
connecting people’s demand prices to their incomes into a proper demand function p (Q)
D
connecting demand prices to the quantity, Q, consumed. Since each person consumes either 1
unit or no units of the indivisible good, the quantity consumed in the population as a whole can
be represented equally well by the number of consumers or by as the proportion of the population
that chooses to consume it. We adopt the second interpretation so that Q is at once a a variable in
the demand function and an aspect of the distribution of income. The distribution of income can
be represented by a function Q(Y) where Q is the proportion of the population with incomes in
excess of Y. Corresponding to any distribution function Q(Y), there must be an inverse function
Y(Q). Plugging function Y(Q) into the demand function p (Y) connecting price and income, we
D
arrive at the demand curve 
p (Q) = p (Y(Q))        (10)
DD
which is the demand curve we seek. The demand curve is downward-sloping because p is an
D 
increasing function of Y, and Y is a decreasing function of Q.
Figure 3: The Distribution of IncomeIt is customary to describe the distribution of income as a distorted S with two long tails,
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one, as shown in figure 3, for high incomes and the other for low incomes, but with no minimum
income such as Y  in figure 3. The shape in figure 3 is postulated to conform to a Pareto
#
distribution because the Pareto distribution has nice properties that simplify the exposition and
facilitate the development of a numerical example. A normal or lognormal distribution might be
more realistic, but far less tractable. A case can also be made for the shape in figure 3 as
appropriate for the study of indivisible goods, where the relevant Y is some notion of purchasing
power rather than actual disposable income. For example, a person who earns a great deal of
money every three years and loses money in between would be shown in the statistics as having
negative a income every two out of three years, but his purchasing power - which is what matters
in his demand for the indivisible good - would always be positive. There must be some minimum
income in the sense of purchasing power as long as nobody starves to death.
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The process is simplified enormously when the demand price is a multiple of income as
exemplified by equation (9) because, in that case, the demand function for the indivisible good
and the distribution of income are virtually the same. The distribution of income is commonly
represented on a graph like that in figure 3 with income on the horizontal axis and the proportion
of the population with less than that income on the vertical axis.  But, for constructing a demand
5
curve, we are interested in the proportion of people with incomes above, rather than below, any
given income. This is represented by the distance Q(Y) between the curve in figure 3 and a flat
line at a height of 1 above the horizontal axis. For reasons that will soon become evident, we are
supposing there to be a minimal income, Y .
#
Figure 4: The Demand and Supply Curves for the Indivisible Good  The density function of the Pareto distribution is 
6
   f(Y) = ì(Y )  (Y)
# ì -  ì -1
where Y  is lowest income, there is no upper limit on y, and ì is the equality parameter. The
#  
parameter ì has been observed to be about 3 in many countries, and it is assumed here to be 3
exactly. It follows that the proportion of the population with incomes between Y  and Y is 
#
which must equal 1 when y rises to infinity. Since the proportion of the population with incomes
between Y  and y is 1 - (Y /Y) , the proportion, Q(Y), of the population with incomes equal to or
## ì  
greater than y must be (Y /Y) as indicated in equation (11). Estimates of ì for many times and
# ì 
places vary from a low of about 1.25 to a high of about 2.50. See Bronfenbrenner (1971), page
46. For Rome at the time of Cicero, the value of ì was estimated to be 1.5.
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The function Y(Q) (which is only an inch away from the demand curve for the indivisible
good when p  is a fixed multiple of Y) is obtained by a 90  anti-clockwise rotation distribution of
D0
income function in figure 3 and then by measuring income on what was the flat line a distance of
1 above the horizontal axis. The demand curve itself is obtained by replacing Y with the
corresponding value of p . The resulting demand curve, together with the supply curve for the
D
indivisible good, is shown in figure 4. In the figure, the supply curve is assumed to be flat, and
the demand price is assumed to be connected to income by equation (9) so that, except for the
rotation and the uniform contraction of the vertical axis, the curves in figures 3 and 4 are
identical. 
The construction of the demand curve for the indivisible good is especially simple when
the distribution of income conforms to a Pareto function 
(11) Q(Y) = (Y /Y)
# ì
where Y# is the income of the poorest person in the economy and where ì is an equality
parameter; the larger ì, the more equal the distribution of income must be . Converting income
6
into the demand price in accordance with equation (9), the demand curve becomes 
(12) Q = (Y /Y) = [Y  (A - 1)/A](p )
# ì  #D - ì
where the expression in square brackets is a constant and there the parameter ì which began life
as a measure of the degree of equality in the income distribution is now reborn as the elasticity of
demand for an indivisible good. In general, one would expect that, the more equal theWith a normal or lognormal distribution of income, there must still be a function Q(Y)
7
for each distribution of income, but there would be no simple counterpart to the identification of
ì with the elasticity of demand for the indivisible good.
13
distribution of income, the greater the elasticity of demand for an indivisible good, but the clean
equality in equation (12) is dependent on our simplifying assumptions.
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When the supply curve of the indivisible good is flat and at a height, p , (the cost of
C
production) above the horizontal axis, the quantity demanded per person is Q  at the intersection
*
of the supply and demand curves. The quantity demanded person is less than 1 because the price,
p  , exceeds the demand price of the poorest person in the community. At a higher price, p  , a
CM
larger proportion, Q  , of the population would prefer not to purchase the indivisible good. Areas
**
of surplus, R, M and L, will be discussed below.
The difference in the forms of the demand curves for an indivisible good, for a person and
for the community, has its counterpart in a difference in the measures of surplus, defined here in
the usual way as the dollar value of having the good available at the market price as compared
with not having it at all. For an ordinary good, the surplus to the entire population is the surplus
to an individual writ large. If the demand curve in figure 4 were for an ordinary good and if
peoples utility function were Cobb-Douglas as in equation (2), the total surplus would be the area
between the demand curve and the supply curve, and that surplus would be apportioned among
people in accordance with their incomes 
For an indivisible good, a person’s surplus is the difference between  his demand price
and the market price. When the cost of production is p  , the surplus, S(Y), of a person with an
C
income Y is
S(Y) = p (Y) -  p (13)
DC
as long as his demand price exceeds the market price, and is 0 otherwise because none of the
indivisible good would be consumed. If everybody’s utility function was as specified in equation
(5) ands if it just so happens that the poorest person is just indifferent between buying and not
buying the indivisible good, then p (Y ) =  p and p (Y) = [(A - 1)/A]Y so that 
D# C  D
S(Y) = p (Y) -  p (Y )  = [(A - 1)/A][Y - Y ]  (14)
DD # #
For both types of goods, the community’s surplus per head, S, is the area between the
demand curve and the supply curve as shown in figure 4, but, for an indivisible good, the surplus
becomes 
       (15)        
       Replacing S(Y)by  [(A - 1)/A][Y - Y ] from equation (14) and replacing f(Y) by its value
8#
in the Pareto distribution, equation (15) becomes 
S = S(Y)f(Y)dY = [(A - 1)/A]  [Y - Y ]ì(Y )  (Y) dY
## ì -  ì -1
= [(A - 1)/A]ì(Y )   [Y - Y ](Y) dY  
# ì #-  ì  -1
=[(A - 1)/A]ì(Y ) (Y)  - Y (Y) ]dY 
# ì - ì #-   ì  -1
where the upper limit of the integral is 0, so that 
S = - [(A - 1)/A]ì(Y ) {[(1/(- ì + 1)](Y )  - [1/(-ì)]Y (Y ) }
# ì #-  ì  + 1  # # - ì
= - [(A - 1)/A]ì(Y ) {[(1/(- ì + 1)](Y )  - [1/(-ì)]Y (Y ) }
# ì #-  ì  + 1  # # - ì
= - [(A - 1)/A]ì(Y ){[(1/(- ì + 1)] - [1/(-ì)]} = [(A - 1)/A](Y )[(1/(ì - 1)]
# #  
14
where f(Y) is the distribution function of income and as long as the demand price of the poorest
person and the cost of production are assumed to be the same. If there is a Pareto distribution of
income and if everybody’s utility is in accordance with equation (3), the surplus in equation (15)
reduces to
S = [(A - 1)/A][1/(ì - 1)]Y   (16)
#
The surplus is directly proportional to the income of the poorest person in the community and
inversely proportional to the degree of equality in the distribution of income. The less equal the
 distribution of income, the larger the surplus turns out to be.  
8
The Social Cost of the Monopolization of an Indivisible Goods
For all goods, whether indivisible or ordinary, monopolization breaks the surplus, S, as it
would be if the good were not monopolized into three parts: the monopoly revenue, M, the
residual surplus, R, associated with consumption not deterred by monopolization, and the loss of
surplus or deadweight loss, L, from the reduction in consumption induced by the rise in price, as
shown in figure 4. 
S = M + R + L (17)Equation (19) is derived bymaximizing M with respect to p . From equation (18),
9M
M = Q(p  - p ) = [N(p ) (p ) ][p  - p ] = [N(p ) ][(p ) - p (p  ) ]
Mc C ì M-   ì MC C ì M-   ì  + 1    C M -ì
Therefore         äM/äp   = [N(p ) ][(-ì + 1)(p ) - p (- ì)(-p  ) ] = 0 
MC ì M-   ì    CM - ì  - 1
On factoring out [N(p ) ](p ) , we see that (-ì + 1) = (- ì)(p  )(p  )
C ì M-  ì   CM  -  1
from which equation (19) follows immediately.
15
For ordinary goods, the cost of the monopolization, the residual surplus and the loss of
surplus are spread throughout the income distribution, more or less in proportion to income,
exactly so if everybody’s income elasticity of demand is equal to 1. For indivisible goods,
monopolization has a marked distributional bias, funnelling the cost of monopolization onto
some people more than others. It is the purpose of this section and the next to show the nature of
bias, to explain how M, R and L come to have different impacts on rich and poor, to estimate the
magnitudes of M, R and L from parameters of the utility function and the distribution of income,
and to suggest an alternative measure of deadweight loss taking account of the distributional
impact of monopolization.
The monopolist sets a price, p , to maximize his profit, M, where 
M
M = Q(p  -  p ) (18)
M C
For an indivisible good where everybody’s preference is represented by the utility function in
equation (3) and where the demand curve is a reflection of the distribution of income in
accordance with equation (12), the monopolist’s revenue-maximizing price, turns out to be
9
p  =  p ì /(ì - 1) (19)
MC
With in p   figure 4 interpreted as the monopoly price, the corresponding quantity Q  can be
M*
computed from equation (12). It follows at once from equation (19) that the minimum income,
Y  , at which one buys a unit of the indivisible good when it is monopolized is 
M
Y  = p A/(A - 1) = Y  ì/(ì - 1) (20)
MM #
Our object in what follows is to show how the original surplus, S, when an indivisible
good is available at its cost of production, p , is apportioned between the revenue of the
C
monopolist, M, the residual surplus, R, to people who continue to consume the indivisible good
even at the monopoly price, and the loss of surplus, L, to people deterred by the higher from
consuming the good at all. Specifically, we wish to quantify the proportions, M/S, R/S and L/S.
On the strength of the special assumptions we have made about the common utility function and
the distribution of income, it turns out that these proportions will depend on only one parameter,16
the measure, ì, of the degree of equality in the distribution of income. Our task is simplified if it
is supposed that Q  in figure 4 is equal to 1, in other words that 
**
(21)  p   = [(A - 1)/A]Y      
C   #
signifying that the poorest person is indifferent between buying and not buying the indivisible
good.
Determination of the ratios M/S, R/S and L/S, requires assumptions about the parameters
in the formulae we have derived. Let ì = 2, Y  = $30,000, A = 1.2, and p  = $5,000, which is
#C
consistent with equation (21) above. Then,
- from equation (19), it follows that p  = p ì/(ì - 1) = $10,000
MC
- from equation (20), it follows that Y  = p A/(A - 1) = Y  ì/(ì - 1) = $60,000
MM #
- from equation (11), it follows that Q  = Q(Y ) = (Y /Y )  = .25
*M # M ì
meaning that monopolization reduces consumption of the indivisible good by 75%. 
- from equation (16), it follows that the total surplus per person is
S = [(A - 1)/A][1/(ì - 1)]Y  = $5,000
#
- the revenue of the monopolist per person is  
M = (p  - p  )Q(Y ) = ([ì/(ì - 1)] -1) p  (Y /Y )
MC M C# M ì
     = S [(ì- 1)/ì]   = $1,250
ì
The residual surplus per person once the indivisible good is monopolized becomes 
R =            (22)
which is the product of the surplus as it would be if the minimal income were Y  rather than Y ,
M#
weighted by the proportion, Q(Y ) of the population with incomes in excess of Y . Using
MM
equation (16),
R = S{Y /Y }{Y /Y ) = $2,500  (23)
M* #M ì
Finally, the loss of surplus per person becomes  17
L =  (24)
which can be obtained as a residual,
L = S - M - L = $1,250 
Thus, as ratios of total surplus, the three components become 
M/S = 1,250/5,000 = .25
 R/S = 2,500/5,000 = .50
and   L/S  = 1,250/5000 = .25
Of the total surplus from the indivisible good if it were not monopolized, 75% 
(.25 + .50) would accrue to the richer 25% of the population with incomes over $60,000, and the
remaining 25% would accrue to the poorer 75% of the population with incomes between $30,000
and $60,000. These estimates of M/S, R/S and L/S are cooked in that they depend entirely upon
the parameters we have chosen, but the story they tell might have a more general application. 
Monopolization takes away more than half of what would otherwise be the surplus to the rich,
but it takes away the whole of what would otherwise be the surplus of the poor. In fact, if the
monopolist were among the rich, then the rich, as a class, would lose nothing from
monopolization, but the poor would remain no better off than if the monopolized good did not
exist at all. 
When the monopolized good is indivisible, the area M is at once a profit of the
monopolist and a cost of monopolization to the rich, while the area L is at once a loss to the poor
and the deadweight loss to the economy as a whole. This is fundamentally different from the
monopolization of ordinary goods where the burden of monopoly is shared by everyone more or
less in proportion to income.
The cost of production of the indivisible good is assumed to be just high enough to make
the poorest person indifferent between consuming a unit or not. Dropping that assumption does
not change the story very much. If the cost of production were higher than the demand price of
the poorest person - that is, if p  > p (Y ) - then a group of very poor people would desist from
CD #
consuming the indivisible good even if it were not monopolized, and the story we have told
would be confined to segment of the population that does consume the indivisible good at the
competitive price. If the cost of production were lower - that is, if p  <  p (Y ) - the monopolist’s
CD #
price would at, a minimum, be set equal to p (Y ) because the demand curve is vertical up to that
D#
price. One cannot say a priori whether a higher price would be advantageous.18
Measuring Deadweight Loss in Utils
The measure, L/S, of deadweight loss as a proportion of total potential surplus is the
usual indicator of the harm from monopoly. The measure is typically employed as part of the
case against monopolization or as an indicator of cost in a comparison of  costs and benefits to
determine whether monopolization is justified in some circumstances, notably as a goad to
invention. For ordinary goods, the ratio L/S seems a reasonable indicator of harm because the
harm is widespread throughout the income distribution. For indivisible goods, the ratio may be
an understatement because it fails to take account of monopoly’s distributive consequences. 
In any society where income is redistributed - through progressive taxation,
unemployment insurance, welfare, food stamps, socialized medical care, and so on - the choice of
redistributive programs may be thought of as the maximization of a utilitarian measure of social
welfare where the interpersonal trade-off is in utils rather than in dollars and where redistribution
is always expensive in the sense that a dollar’s worth of benefit to the poor can only be attained
at the cost of something more than one dollar to the rich. It may be appropriate in this context to 
measure the ratio of deadweight loss to total original surplus is utils as well. 
This measure is easily constructed within the assumptions in this article. It follows from
the special utility function in equation (5) that the marginal utility of a person with an income of
Y is 1/Y. Measured in utils, a person’s surplus from the an indivisible good purchased at a price
p  becomes 
C
S*(Y) = uN(Y)(p (Y) - p ) = (1/Y)(p (Y) - p )  (25)
DC DC
and the surplus to the community, S  , as a whole becomes  
*
=   (1/Y)( p (Y)  - p )f(Y)dy (26)
DC
the loss of surplus in utils, L  , becomes 
*
L  =   (1/Y)( p (Y)  -p )f(Y)dY (27)
*D C
and, as shown in the appendix, the utility-weighted ratio of loss of surplus to total surplus
becomes
L /S  = 1 - 2[ì/(ì - 1)]  = 1 - 2(1/2)  = ..5
**  - ì 2
The the ratio of deadweight loss to total potential surplus from monopolization of indivisible19
goods rises from 25% to 50% when measurement is converted from dollars to utils.
Monopolization may sometimes appear to be justified by one measure but not the other. 
The Politics of Indivisible Goods
Indivisibility has two large political implications. It avoids a principal defect in the public
provision of certain goods and services, and it strengthens the case for alternatives to patents as a
way of encouraging innovation. We consider these in turn.
Public Provision of Private Goods: The main task of the government is to provide public
goods such as the army and the police, but governments also provide private goods such as
education, health care and public housing. Among the arguments for the public provision of
certain private goods are these:
- Assistance to the Poor: Universal public provision of private goods is redistributive
when financed by progressive taxation. It is even more redistributive if the good provided is
something the poor will accept but the rich will not. Public housing is the prime example. Even if
public housing were offered to everyone, the rich would refuse the gift because publically-
provided houses would be too small and incommodious.  
- Altruism: No matter what my own income, I may prefer to live in a society with a
relatively narrow distribution than to live in a society with great discrepancies between the
incomes of the rich and incomes of the poor. I may care not only about my children, but about the
entire next generation.
- Paternalistic Altruism: One’s concern for other people may carry more weight for some
commodities than for others. I may not care whether you ride a car or a bicycle, or whether you
live in a big house or a little house, but it may care if you are unable to afford medical treatment
when you are sick or if your children are denied a proper education...
- Externalities: I want your children to be well educated so that my children will live in a
country of well-educated people. Externalities may flow from a good itself, regardless of how it
is financed, or it may flow from public, but not private,  provision. All schooling may create
more productive citizens, but it could be the case that only public schooling creates civic virtues.
- Insurance: Public provision, especially of medical care, avoids some of the
disadvantages of private insurance. Insurance companies have a strong incentive to let
chronically ill people die  Insurance companies are understandably reluctant to insure people
known to be in ill-health.. Ideally, we should insure ourselves while still in the womb, but there
are certain difficulties in doing so. Public provision does so automatically.
Against these arguments for public  provision, it may be objected that each person shouldFinanced by progressive taxation, public provision of  private goods may be evaluated
10
by voters as a trade off between an implicit redistribution of income and the possibility of a
mismatch between the amount of the good provided by the government and the amount each
20
stand on his own feet and should consume no more than can be purchased with his earnings, or
that government activities are invariably inefficient and corrupt. These objections are ignored in
this paper to focus on another: that redistribution should always be in cash rather than in kind.
Better to provide an old age pension, unemployment insurance or a negative income tax than to
provide health care, education or public housing. The rationale of this objection is that, any given
amount of public expenditure for the benefit of the poor leaves recipients are worse off when
provided with goods than when provided with enough money to buy those goods, or something
else, as they please.
Consider a program to supply every person with some commodity. If the commodity can
be bought or sold at the going market price, then the only difference between redistribution in
cash or in kind is the government’s waste of time and money in procuring and distributing the
commodity. A person who wants more than the government supplies, buys an additional amount.
A person who wants less sells the excess. Better for the government to supply each person with
an equivalent amount of money to be spend on whatever that person values most. It would make
no sense whatever for the government to supply everybody with a head of lettuce per week. The
case against public provision in these circumstances is that it is entirely ineffectual.
Public provision can only influence consumption when, for some reason, people have to
be content with the amount that the government supplies. Nobody can sell part of his right to
public medical care or public education. But the influence of public provision may be perverse.
Suppose that the government supplies x units, and suppose, as would often be the case, that some
people prefer to buy more than x while other people would prefer to buy less than x if the good
were available on the market instead. Everybody would become  better off with a cash grant of
enough money to buy x units because consumption of the good would no longer be tied to what
the government, in its wisdom, chooses to supply. If the good in question is housing and if the
government supplies everybody with a certain size of house, then people who would prefer a
smaller house and a bigger car, or a bigger house and a smaller car, are both disappointed. 
The difficulty is compounded when goods come in many shapes and sizes. Some people
own one necktie, others own a great many, others own none at all. Some neckties are cheap;
other neckties are expensive. Everybody has his own preferences for colour and design.  Public
provision of a single uniform neck tie would be as ridiculous as a law requiring everybody to buy
identical neckties. Almost everybody, rich or poor, would prefer to devote the cost to something
else. Nobody would be better off than if he were given the money instead.  
The “cash rather than kind” objection is powerful but not decisive. Other things being
equal, the less people’s diversity of preference for a good, the weaker the “cash rather than kind”
argument turns out to be.  The objection is at its weakest for the socialization of  indivisible
10person would prefer the government to supply.  There may or may not be a majority in favour of
public provision depending on the relative strengths of these two considerations. The latter has
little or no importance for indivisible goods. See, Usher, D., “The Welfare Economics of the
Socialization of Commodities”, Journal of Public Economics, 1977, 151-68. 
On this topic, see Usher, D., “Public Provision of Indivisible Private Goods in Short
11
Supply”, Public Finance Review, 2002, 385-415.
Other aspects of patents - the boundary between patentable inventions and unpatentable
12
science, the complex interplay between public and private funding of research, the arcane
economics of patent scope, legal ploys to extend patent life, international conflict over patent
protection, the benefits and costs of the race among would-be patent holders to invent first and
the occasional failure of the patent system to draw forth socially advantageous research on new
products - are all ignored in this paper. There is a vast literature on each of these topics. See, for
21
goods. If everybody would be prepared to buy the indivisible good voluntarily - as would be the
case when p (Y ) > p  - public provision would be superfluous. Otherwise, it would have no
D# C
effect upon the purchase by the rich, would supply the good to poor people who might be
unwilling to buy it for themselves, and would be somewhat redistributive when financed by
proportional or progressive income taxation. In such circumstances, arguments for public
provision based upon paternalistic altruism, externalities or insurance might easily prevail. 
Though relatively free of the major defect of the socialization of commodities - that
redistribution in kind is, cet par, inferior to redistribution in cash - the socialization of indivisible
goods has a special problem of its own. Ordinary goods can always be supplied by the
government equally. Whatever the total amount of a commodity to be distributed, each person’s
portion can be the same. In a population of - say - a million people, a total supply of 5 million
loaves of bread would provide 5 loaves per person, while a total supply of 3 million loaves would
provide 3 loaves per person. That does not work for indivisible goods. If there are 5 thousand
kidneys available and 20 thousand people who need them, then 15 thousand people must do
without, for 1/4 kidney per person would be of no use to anybody. If indivisible goods are to be
socialized, governments should make every effort, and bear whatever cost is necessary, to be sure
there is enough to go round. Sometimes that is impossible, and a system of rationing must be
devised, notwithstanding the risk of corruption, rent seeking and favouritism. But socialized
medicine on the cheap may be worse for most people than either private medical care or
socialized medicine properly financed.     
11
Expropriation of Patents: A second  political implication of indivisible goods is about the
relative merits of patents and prizes as inducements to invention. To induce invention, the
inventor must be rewarded, by a salary as university professors or scientists in government labs
are rewarded, by prize money bearing some relation to what an agency of government deems the
invention to be worth or by a patent granting the inventor a monopoly on his invention for a
number of years.  . Our concern here is with the relative merits of patents and prizes , and with
12 13example, Arrow (1963), Heller and Eisenberg (1998), Merges and Nelson (1990), Nordhaus
(1969), Tandon (1983), Stegemann and Pazderka (2003), and Usher (believe it or not, 1964).
On prizes and payments for research, see Wright (1983).
13




the pros and cons expropriation. Governments might expropriate patents to some inventions, just
as governments expropriate land in the path of a new highway, on the understanding that
expropriation would be matched by just compensation.  All methods of rewarding invention
14
have serious defects, though it is better to reward inventions defectively then to forgo discoveries
by not rewarding then at all.
The principal defect in the rewarding invention by prizes or in expropriating patents with
just compensation is the absence of a universally-recognized rule for deciding what an invention
is worth. Even under a patent regime, there is some requirement for legal or administrative
discretion in identifying patent-worthy inventions and resolving disputes about priority, but, once
an invention is patented, the income to the patent-holder is determined by the market.
Governmental discretion would be much greater with prizes or expropriation. Some public
agency would have to decide on the value of an invention and on the appropriate fraction of the
full surplus from invention to offer as a reward or as compensation for expropriation. The agency
charged with the responsibility of rewarding inventors directly would surely make mistakes,
over-valuing some inventions and undervaluing others. Absence of a clear standard, would open
the rewarding process to rent seeking and corruption.
The corresponding advantage of prizes or expropriation of patents is that the full surplus
from invention is preserved. With reference to figure 4 above, the market price of the invented
product would be the cost of production, p  , rather than the monopoly price, p  , and the entire
CM
surplus from the availability of the invented good would be become available. If the direct
reward to the inventor were set equal to the monopoly profit, M, the surplus to consumers would
increase from R to R + L. The deadweight loss would be regained. These advantages and
disadvantages pertain to ordinary goods and to indivisible goods as well.
What differentiates indivisible goods from ordinary goods in this context is the nature of
the deadweight loss. A central theme in this paper is the difference between ordinary goods and
indivisible goods in their response to monopolization. When an ordinary good is patented, the
burden of the rise in price is borne by everybody more or less in proportion to their incomes,
exactly so for the particular function we have employed as an example. When an indivisible good
is patented, the effect of the rise in price is borne disproportionately by the poor. Among the
richer people not deterred from consumption, the cost is uniform rather than in proportion to their
incomes. Poorer people are deterred altogether, left in exactly as they would be if the newly-
invented good had not been invented at all. The case for rewarding invention with prizes and for23
expropriation with just compensation is much stronger for indivisible goods than for ordinary
goods.24
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Appendix: Measuring Deadweight Loss from Monopolization  in Utils rather than in
Dollars from Monopolization
Measured in dollars, a person’s surplus from the purchase of a unit of the indivisible good
is [p (Y) -  p  ] where p (Y) is the demand price of a person with an income of Y and  p
DC D C   
is the cost of production. Aperson’s surplus in utils is his surplus in dollars weighted by his
marginal utility of income, dU/dy. 
(dU/dY) [p (Y) -  p  ].  
DC
With the logarithmic utility function in equation (5), the marginal utility of income is equal to
1/Y and the utility-weighted loss of surplus as a proportion of the utility-weighted total surplus
becomes 
 
                                 
where y ,  y  and the distribution function f(y) are as specified in the text. Cancelling out
# M
constants in the numerator and the denominator, the ratio becomes
                                                        
                                    
                                                27
                        
When (y )  is cancelled out of the numerator and the denominator, the ratio becomes
#- µ
                                  
                                
Setting  ì = 2,
                                                   
If  ì = 1.25, signifying a much less equal distribution of income,
       
The less equal the distribution of income, the larger the loss of utility-weighted  surplus from
monopolization.